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LOGIC AND ELEMENTS
RichardD. Friedman*
We may happily agree with Holmes that logic is not the life of the
law' and yet contend that logic should play a significant role in legal
discourse. Logic cannot demonstrate the truth of premises, and so by
itself it cannot demonstrate the merits of a legal argument. Moreover,
even given the premises, it may be that a leap of faith, or intuition, has
an irreducible role at least in some good legal arguments. 2 But at
least a sound legal argument will not be an illogical one. An argument will not be persuasive if it appears to violate basic principles of
logic. If the enunciation of a principle of law is to have any hope of
stability it must be capable of consistent application in situations that
are materially similar, and if the articulation is not logically coherent
this condition is unlikely to prevail.
In this paper, I will explore the use of symbolic logic in discussing
the notion of elements of a claim or a defense. I will use the term
"claim" in a general sense, referring not only to the grounds underlying an action-what is asserted in a complaint or charging instrument-but also to any demand forjudicial relief. Thus, I will speak of
a claim for preliminary relief or for discovery sanctions.
In Part I, I will suggest that the attempt to state a legal argument
by setting out the elements of the claim or the defense symbolically
can often assist the quest for clarity. In Part U, I will explore some of
the limits of this technique, showing that in some cases the very notion of the elements of a claim or a defense breaks down. In Part Im, I
will suggest the outlines of a logic for legal argument that operates
defeasibly and so is significantly different from the classical logic
* Professsor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks to
Howard Pospesel, Bob Rodes, Kevin Saunders, and Doug Walton, especially for

reducing my level of ignorance about non-monotonic reasoning, but also for many
other helpful, and encouraging, suggestions and comments.
1

See OuvER WENDELL

HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW

1 (Boston, Little, Brown

& Co. 1881).
2 See, e.g., Charles M. YablonJustifingtheJudge's Hunch:An Essay on Discretion,41
HA=STNGs L.J. 231 (1990); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of "Hunch" inJudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 73:3

presented vividly and engagingly in a wonderful new text, Premisesand
3
Conclusions, by Robert Rodes and Howard Pospesel.
I.

PAYING ATrENTION TO THE STRuCTURE OF A CLAIM

When Ijudge moot court arguments, I often ask a student a question such as, "Well, suppose we disagree with you on Point I of your
argument. Do you lose?" or perhaps, "OK Suppose we agree with
you on Point I. Do you win?" And sometimes I am disappointed to
realize that the student cannot answer with confidence-which usually means that he or she has not thought out the structure of the
argument with sufficient care. I do not believe it is necessary that
most lawyers become comfortable, or even understand, the full rigor
and richness of Rodes and Pospesel's exposition. But I do believe that
legal discourse is hindered substantially if lawyers do not understand
or are unable to present the structure of a claim with a substantial
degree of rigor. (Note the disjunctive in that sentence, by the way.
Perhaps the sentence has a superfluous clause in that "unable to presenf' implies "do not understand." But even if this is so-I am not sure
that it is-the hindrance is probably greater when "unable to present" as well as "do not understand" is true.)
I find that symbolic logic often helps in achieving the requisite
degree of rigor. In this Part, I will illustrate how. For now, I will use
the same notation as do Rodes and Pospesel. 4 Some of what follows is
not only straightforward but also so simple that perhaps I should be
embarrassed walking through it in the shadow of the highly sophisticated analysis of Rodes and Pospesel. But, as I have suggested, I believe many capable students, and presumably lawyers as well, fail to
engage in the type of elementary logical analysis illustrated here, and
so fail to understand fully the logical structure and consequences of
their cases. Moreover, the elementary uses of logic provide a platform
on which to analyze more complex problems and to consider more
sophisticated concepts.
A.

Basic Structures

Consider first a claim with a simple conjunctive structure. Suppose the structure is
3 ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMIsEs AND CONCLUSIONS: SYMBOLIC LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYsis (1997).

4

Thus, A -- B means "A implies B," A

*-

B means "A is equivalent to B," A v B

means "A or B," A & B means "A and B," (x) means "For all x it is true that .. . " and
3x means "There exists an x such that .... "

1998]

LOGIC AND ELEMENTS

(A&B & C)

(1)

-L,

where A, B, and C are each disputed propositions and L is the proposition that liability is established. In this case, it should be clear that
the plaintiff (assuming that is the party arguing for liability) wins if
and only if each of the propositions A, B, and C is true. 5 And because
it follows from Proposition 1 that
-L
(2)
-(A & B & Q
and
-(A & B & Q) - -A v -B v -C,

(3)

it is enough for the defendant to win that the court be persuaded that
any one of the propositions A, B, or C is false.
Now consider a claim with a simple disjunctive structure. Suppose the structure is
(4)
(Av B v C) ++ L.
It is elementary that in this case the plaintiff wins if any one or more
of the three propositions, A, B, and C are true. And because it follows
from Proposition 4 that
(5)
+ -L,
-(A v B v
and
-(A v B v C)

-A & -B & -C,

(6)

the defendant can win if and only if each of the three propositions A,
B, and C appears to be false.
B.

Applicationsfor Issue Preclusion

Setting out the elements of a claim symbolically is often particularly helpful in analyzing matters of issue preclusion. The general verdicts issued by many American civil juries often leave an open
question of whether a particular issue was actually decided in the first
litigation. Logical analysis can sometimes resolve the problem. 6 Con5 I am putting aside for now the question of the burdens of proof. I will address
the burden of pleading later. I am also putting aside the so-called problem of conjunction. This is, the question of what happens if the factfinder is persuaded that
each of the elements of the claim is established to the requisite level of confidence,
but that the aggregated proposition-here (A & B & G)-is not. I address this problem at some length in Richard D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1
INT'LJ. EVIDENCE & PROOF 276, 279-84 (1997).
6 Kevin Saunders, a participant in this symposium, has presented a far more sophisticated logic for evaluating matters of issue preclusion in A Logicfor the Analysis of
CollateralFstoppe4 12 RUTCERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 99 (1986). For most workday
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purposes, however, I believe the analysis presented here functions just as well, and
without the disadvantage of a considerable degree of extra complexity.
Saunders focuses on the problem that, because factfinding in litigation is probabilistic-that is, a factfinder may conclude for purposes of the litigation that a given
proposition is true even in the face of uncertainty as to its truth-prior findings that
each of two or more propositions is true do not necessarily imply that the factfinder
would conclude that the conjunction of the propositions is true. This is an interesting
variation on the much discussed "problem of conjunction," to which I have referred,
see supranote 5. Saunders' analysis operates on the premise, with which I agree, that
if (1) P and Q are the essential elements of the plaintiff's claim, (2) the governing
standard of persuasion is "more likely than not," and (3) the factfinder concludes that
P and Q each satisfy this standard but that the conjunction P & Q does not, then the
defendant is entitled to judgment.
I do not believe that the problem as posed by Saunders is usually a serious difficulty, however: If P and Q were both found in litigation previous to one in which the
plaintiff seeks to have the conjunction P & Q established preclusively, it will usually be
because both P and Q were established in one prior litigation, and the conjunction P
& Q was a necessary finding for the outcome in that litigation.
Interestingly, Saunders' analysis seems to point to a broader problem that
neither it nor prevailing preclusion doctrine solves. Suppose that in prior litigation,
under circumstances satisfying the preconditions for preclusion, a jury must have
found P against the current defendant, and that in the current litigation the plaintiff
needs to establish the conjunction P & Q to win the action. The defendant may
argue,
True, the prior jury found P against me, but it was not necessarily certain on that point; presumably the jury had at least some uncertainty. If the
current jury were trying P and it had some uncertainty about that proposition, that uncertainty would raise the probability to which it would have to
find Q in order for it to find the conjunction P & Q against me. I'm entitled
to the benefit of that uncertainty! You mustn't let it evaporate by instructing
the currentjury to treat P as established to a certainty when there is no basis
for concluding that this is what the prior jury found.
Note that if the court tries to appease the defendant by instructing the current
jury to treat P as established only to the minimum level of confidence that the prior
jury might have had, this would undercut preclusion doctrine very substantially. A
finding that P was barely more likely than not presumably could have supported the
judgment in the prior action, if all other elements of the claim in that action were
established with near certainty. If the current jurors were instructed to treat P as
established only to the extent of being "barely more likely that not" that would mean
that they could not find for the plaintiff unless they found Q nearly to a certainty.
I believe this is a quite difficult problem. In Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, Friedman, supranote 5, at 284 nn.17-18, I analyzed the related problem of how,
if the trial is bifurcated, with a trial first of P and then of Q, the factfinder's uncertainty at the first stage might be imported into the second stage. A suggestion made
there-that the factfinder at the first stage be asked to make some (presumably nonnumerical) assessment of its uncertainty-might be appropriate in the preclusion
context as well, if the possibility of future preclusion is anticipated at the first trial. In
a bench trial, this should be relatively easy given the court's articulation of its reasoning, and even if future preclusion is not anticipated at the first trial, the second judge

19981

LOGIC AND

ELEMENTS

sider first Variation 1 of a classic hypothetical.7 Alfred sues Barbara
for auto negligence in a state that has a contributory negligence defense, but no compulsory counterclaim rule. Barbara raises the contributory negligence defense and wins a general verdict. Then
Barbara sues Alfred, and Alfred raises the contributory negligence defense. What effect does the doctrine of issue preclusion have? To win
in Action 1, Alfred would have had to prevail on the proposition (-A
& B), where A and B represent, respectively, the negligence of Alfred
and Barbara. Barbara's verdict means that the jury found (A v -B),
but we cannot know for sure whether the jury found A or whether it
found -B-and afortioriwe cannot know whether the jury found (A &
-B), which is what Barbara would have to demonstrate to prevail in
her action. There is no preclusive effect.
Now consider an actual textbook case, Illinois Central GulfRailroad
v. Parks,8 in which Bertha Parks won a negligence action against the
railroad. Thus, she must have persuaded the firstjury of (Nr & -Nb &
Ib), where Nx is the negligence of x, Ix is personal injury to x, r is the
railroad, and b is Bertha. In the same action, her husbandJessie, who
sought damages for loss of Bertha's services and consortium, lost a
general verdict. Contributory negligence would defeat Jessie's claim.
It appears, therefore, that the jury must have been persuaded of-(Nr
& -Nj & Cj), where j represents Jessie and Cx represents the damages
to x for loss of consortium. Jessie then brought a separate action for
his personal injuries. 9 What preclusive effect does the first action
have? To prevail in the second action, Jesse must prove (Nr & -Nj &
Ij). Nr was essential to the judgment against the railroad in Bertha's
action, and so the railroad may be precluded on that issue. 10 But is
Jessie precluded with respect to Nj? The verdict in the first action
against Jessie means that the jury found (-Nr v Nj v -Gj). We know
from the verdict for Bertha that the jury did not find -Nr. The railroad, trying to win by a process of elimination, further contended that
might be able to discern the level of uncertainty of the firstjudge (who might be the
same person). In ajury trial, a special interrogatory would be necessary on the verdict
form ("Which best expresses your level of confidence in P? Virtually certain; highly
likely; substantially more likely than not; barely more likely than not.").
7 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIvIL PROCEDURE 822 note 5 (4th ed. 1996).
8 390 N.E.2d 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), excerpted inYEAZELL, supra note7, at 819.
9 Some courts presumably would have held this action barred by claim preclusion, on the ground that Jessie should have asserted the claim in the first action;
apparently the governing law of claim preclusion was not so aggressive, however.
10 There is a non-mutuality issue-given that Jessie could not have been precluded by a finding in favor of the railroad in Bertha's action against it-but many

courts, like the Parks court, would not be deterred by this factor from ruling in favor
of preclusion.
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the jury could not have found -Cj because Jessie's evidence on this
point was uncontroverted. But the court, perhaps overly generously,
accepted Jessie's argument that his evidence on consortium in the
first action was minimal and may have been rejected by the jury. So
Jessie got the sweet of issue preclusion without the bitter.
Now turn to another type of problem-when we know just what
the factfinder decided, but at least arguably it decided more than was
necessary for resolution of the case. Consider Variation 2 of the Alfred-Barbara hypothetical. I1 This is the same as Variation 1 except
that the jury in Action 1 specifically finds (A & B)-that is, both parties are negligent, leading to ajudgment for Barbara. If we take the
view of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,12 that an issue is precluded only if it was "essential to the judgment," what is the preclusive
effect now? We can ask whether a finding was essential to the judgment by asking whether the judgment would stand absent that finding. B was not essential to the judgment, because a finding of (A & B) would, afortiori,lead to judgment for Barbara. But A was essential
to the judgment for Barbara, because a finding of (-A & B) would
have led to a judgment for Alfred.
With respect to this type of problem, too, symbolic logic can help
analyze actual cases as well as hypotheticals. In Halpern v. Schwartz,I 3
any one of three determinations would have been sufficient (given
other requirements) to drive Halpern into bankruptcy. The trial
court made all three-H & C & P, where H is a transfer with intent to
hinder and delay creditors, C is a transfer without fair consideration,
and P is preferential payment of a prior debt. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, but without opinion. 14 In Action 2, Halpern sought a discharge from bankruptcy,
which would be denied if H were established; C and P did not bear on
the discharge question. This time, the Second Circuit held that Halpern was not precluded from challenging H by the finding against her
in Action 1. The court believed that if the trial court in Action 1 had
based its decision on multiple grounds, it was less likely to give each
one serious consideration and that vigorous review of each one would
be unlikely.' 5
Now compare Winters v. Lavine,16 decided by the same court.
Winters sought Medicaid compensation in New York courts for the
See YEAzELL, supra note 7, at 831 note 6.
12 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
13 426 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1970), excerpted inYEAZELL, supra note 7, at 824.
11

14
15
16

See id. at 103.
See id. at 105.
574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978), excerpted in YEAZELL, supra note 7, at 827.
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services of a Christian Science practitioner. She was defeated on two
grounds, that the statute constitutionallydenied her the claimed benefits and that her proofof illness and treatment was inadequate. 17 She
8
then brought a federal civil rights action challenging the denial.'
The Second Circuit held that she was precluded by the results of the
first action. The court essentially rejected the analysis of Halpern, limiting its effect to the bankruptcy context and approving the stance of
the first Restatement that ["w]here the judgment is based upon the
matters litigated as alternative grounds, the judgment is determinative
of both grounds, although either alone would have been sufficient to
support the judgment."' 9
It seems to me, however, that the results-though not the underlying theory-in Halpern and Winters might be broadly reconcilable.
The holding of Halpern is essentially that, although the trial court in
Action 1 determined (H & C & P), the first judgment could only be
preclusive of (H v C v P), because this is the minimum we know was
necessary to support the result of Action 1. Applied to Winters, this
would mean that the preclusive effect of Action 1 would be limited to
(C v P)-that is, that either the statute constitutionally denied Winters
the claimed benefits or that her proof was inadequate. But now notice the different posture of the respective second actions. In Halpern,
only H mattered in Action 2, and (H v C v P) does not imply H. In
Winters, though, it appears at least plausible that (C v P) would defeat
the plaintiff in Action 2. That is, ifin Action 2, the court accepts that
Action 1 established at least the proposition that one basis or the
other for the result in that action should be deemed to be true, and if
either one would be sufficient to defeat Winters in Action 2, the court
in Action 2 might conclude that she should be precluded on the basis
of the disjunctive proposition, without establishing one side or the
other of the disjunction. This argument might be fortified by a point
that I will now argue, that all or practically all claims in fact have disjunctive as well as conjunctive aspects.

17 See id. at 51.
18

See id. at 52. As in Parks, the court applied a relatively narrow view of claim

preclusion. It relied on its prior holding, concerning claim preclusion in actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in Lombard v. Board of Education,502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
Lombard has subsequently been disapproved. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 n.6 (1984).
19 RFSrATEMENT OFJUDGMENTS § 68, cmt. n (1942), quoted in Winters, 574 F.2d at
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THE STRucruRE OF A

CLAIM

In Part I, I have tried to show how thinking about the structure of
a claim in terms of its elements can be useful, and even essential, in
some circumstances. But now I will discuss some complications in the
nature of a claim-complications that sometimes, I believe, break
down the elemental approach.
In Part I, I have discussed claims that had either conjunctive or
disjunctive aspects, but not both. It is apparent that a claim will not
always have so simple a structure. As rendered by Rodes and Pospesel, 20 42 U.S.C. § 402, part of the Social Security Act, entities a person to an old-age insurance benefit under the following condition,
which for present purposes we may assume is necessary as well as
sufficient:
Ix & Ax & (Fx v Dx),

(7)

where Ix = x is a fully insured individual; Ax = x has attained age 62;
Fx = x has filed an application for old-age insurance benefits; and Dx
= x was entitled to disability insurance for the month preceding the
month in which x attained the retirement age. Suppose now that
counsel for the claimant, c, is asked, "If you lose with respect to Ic, do
you lose the case? How about if you lose with respect to Fc?" A
proper answer might be, "If we lose with respect to Ic, we do indeed
lose the case. But if we lose with respect to Fc, I would still hope to
persuade you that Dc is true, and if you also accept that Ic and Ac are
true, then we should win."
Suppose further that the adjudicator says, "Dc seems to be a
tough issue. In what circumstances must I decide it-that is, in which
circumstances will it make a difference to the outcome of the case?"
Dc will be decisive only if two conditions are both satisfied: (1) Given
Dc, the claimant is entitled to the benefit, and (2) given -Dc, the
claimant is not entitled to the benefit. The first condition is satisfied
if and only if both Ic and Ac are true; the second condition is satisfied
if and only if any one or more of the three propositions Ic, Ac, and Fc
are false. Together, the two conditions are satisfied if and only if Ic
and Ac are both true and Fc is false. In that circumstance only is Dc
outcome-determinative.
Examined closely enough, I believe all (or at least practically all)
claims have a complex structure that, like the claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 402, combines conjunctive and disjunctive aspects. I cannot prove
20

RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 3, at 236-37.
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this point deductively, but I will make an inductive argument in two
parts.
First, all claims, looked at closely enough, have conjunctive aspects. We might state the conditions for a claim in simple terms without any conjunctives, but doing so is almost certain to be quite
uninformative. For example, we might say that
T - N vI v S,

(8)

where T = Defendant is liable in tort, N = Defendant is liable for negligence, I = Defendant is liable for intentional tort, and S = Defendant
is strictly liable. But obviously we want to know more. Of what does
negligence consist? It still might be possible to describe this aspect of
the claim without using conjunctives, but only by speaking very conclusorily: Defendant is liable for negligence if he acts negligently. Any
attempt to be more informative is bound to reveal more than one
requirement, at least what the defendant is supposed to have done
and what impact the conduct is supposed to have had. Thus, we
might say that Defendant is liable for negligence if he had a duty of
care that extended to the plaintiff, he breached that duty, the breach
caused an impact on the plaintiff, and the impact was injurious:.
N'- D &B & C &I.

(9)

Now, this statement of the claim for negligence is purely conjunctive. But if we care to look at it more closely, we will almost certainly
be able to find disjunctive elements within it. Suppose, for example,
the plaintiff is claiming that the defendant doctor committed malpractice by waiting too long to perform a Caesarean operation. Now, obviously, there are multiple injuries that might satisfy I; we might
therefore replace I by (II v

12

v...

In). Moreover, the plaintiff is not

limited to one physiological theory as to how the negligence caused
the injury. Therefore, we might also replace C by (C1 v C 2 v...

Cn).

Finally, consider D and B together. There are multiple ways in
which an adjudicator (I am not distinguishing here between judge
and jury) might conclude that these elements are true. Consider the
one factor that is likely to dominate the case, time, and measure it
from some marker, perhaps the first event indicating that a Caesarean
might be warranted. The time when the doctor should have performed the Caesarean, and the time when he did perform it may both
be in doubt. Let Dx = Defendant had a duty to perform a Caesarean
before time x, and Bx = Defendant did not perform the Caesarean
before time x. Then the plaintiff should prevail, so far as elements D
and B are concerned, if
(3x) (Dx & Bx).

(10)
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This expression might be thought of as an infinitely dense disjunction, [(Da &Ba) v (Db & Bb) v.. .], where each subscript represents
an infinitesimally different point in time. Note that the later the time
x, the easier it will be for the plaintiff to prevail on D, but the harder
on B,. If the plaintiff can satisfy the adjudicator that there is some
point in time x such that it is true both that the defendant should
have performed the Caesarean before x and that he did not, then the
plaintiff should prevail.
An expression like Proposition 10, indicating an infinitely dense
disjunction, already suggests how the concept of elements might be
broken down. We may carry the point further. With respect to some
legal claims, what might appear at first as discrete elements are, I believe, better viewed as variables of a multivariate function.
I will take as an illustration the standard for granting a preliminary injunction, and as a particular example the case of William Inglis
& Sons Baking Co. v. =TT ContinentalBaking Co.21 There, the district
court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary relief. Putting the
matter somewhat schematically, that court believed that the plaintiff
must demonstrate (1) a balance of harm favoring the relief, and (2)
odds of success on the merits. 22 The appellate court reversed, holding

that the district court should have considered an "alternative test"
under which ["i]f the harm that may occur to the plaintiff is sufficiently serious, it is only necessary that there be a fair chance of success on the merits. ' 23 Thus, the plaintiff should get the relief if
(Hb & Ob) V (Ha & Oa),

(11)

where the subscripts b and a reflect the harm and the odds necessary
to satisfy, respectively, what we might call the basic test applied by the
district court and the alternative test endorsed by the appellate court.
Hb reflects a lower degree of harm than does Ha, but 0 b (presumably
equal to just over one, corresponding to the "more likely than not"
standard) reflects a higher chance of success on the merits than does
Oa.

All well and good. But why should there be only two discrete
points that justify granting the preliminary injunction? It appears
that, for any given level of harm between those represented by Hb and
Ha, there should be a chance of success on the merits greater than
21 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975), reprinted inYEAZELL, supra note 7, at 349..
22 See id. at 87. The court spoke in terms of probability, but in this case, as will
soon be apparent, it becomes simpler to think at times in terms of the related concept
of odds.
23 Id. at 88 (quoting C. Tennant & Sons, Inc. v. New York Terminal Conference,
299 F. Supp. 796, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
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that represented by Oa but not as great as that represented by Ob that
would warrant the relief. The problem can, I believe, be considered
as a simple matter of decision theory, an attempt to maximize the expected utility of a decision. Under one reasonably plausible set of simplifying assumptions, preliminary relief should be granted if and only
if
Ox (H +1)> 2,
(12)
where 1 represents the amount of harm done by granting the preliminary relief even though the plaintiff would not ultimately prevail on
24
the merits.
Figure 1 illustrates the point. In this diagram, the horizontal axis
shows H, the ratio of the harm caused by denying relief if the plaintiff
would ultimately prevail on the merits to the harm caused by granting
relief if the defendant would ultimately prevail. The vertical axis represents 0, the odds that the plaintiff will prevail. A rule may therefore
be represented as an area within which all points indicate combinations of the two factors warranting relief. The basic test applied by the
24 Define P to be the probability that, if the matter is fully litigated, the plaintiff
will ultimately prevail on the merits. Then 1 - P is the probability that the plaintiff
would not prevail on the merits. Also define U(grTr) to be the utility of granting
preliminary relief if the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits. Similarly,
U(den,A) is the utility of denying relief when the plaintiff would not prevail on the
merits. As a convention, we may assume that both of these utilities-representing
correct decisions-are positive. U(grA) and U(den,Tr) represent mistakes, and so
presumably have lower utilities; as a convention, we may assume that they are each
ordinarily negative.
Now, express EU(gr)-the expected utility of granting the relief-and
EU(den)-the expected utility of denying relief.

EU(gr) = P x U(grr) + [1 - P] x U(grA),
and

(In)

EU(den) = P x (U(den,Tr) + (1 - P] x U(den,A).

(2n)

At the point of indecision, EU(gr) = EU(den); ifP is any greater, EU(gr) > EU(den).
This means that relief should be granted if and only if

P x U(grT) + [I - P] x U(grA) > P x (U(denn) + [1 - P] x U(den,A),

(3n)

or

P x [U(grrr) - U(denjr)] > [ - P] x [(U(den,A) - U(grA)].
(4n)
Thus, relief should be granted if and only if
O x [U(grrr) - U(denji)] > [U(den,A) - U(grA)]
(5n)
where 0 equals the odds that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits, and
so is equal to P/(1 - P).
Now, for simplicity, assume that the absolute values of U(grr), U(den,A), and
U(grA), are all 1. Further, let H equal IU(denr) I-the harm (expressed in positive
terms) caused if the preliminary injunction is denied even though the plaintiff ultimately would prevail on the merits. These assumptions lead algebraically from (5n)
to the rule in the text.
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district court is represented by the two-sided area above and to the
right of point B, with 0 greater than 1, indicating that the plaintiffs
success on the merits is more likely than not, and H also greater than
1, indicating that more harm is done by denying the injunction even
though the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits than is
done by granting the injunction even though the defendant would
ultimately prevail on the merits. The alternative test added by the appellate court is the two-sided rule with its vertex at point A, allowing a
lower probability of success on the merits if the balance of harm is
more tipped to the plaintiff. The analysis here suggests that these two
tests are merely continuous points along a continuum, represented by
the curve C: Any point above that curve represents a combination of
probability of success on the merits and a balance of harms warranting
the preliminary injunction.
0

B
A
H
I

In other words, Proposition 12 suggests that perhaps the factors
of probability (or odds) of success on the merits and balance of harms
should be considered not as severable elements but rather as variables
in a function, F(O,H). A little less of one variable may be compensated by a good deal more of the other. I have presented a mathematical model of such a rule, and I think doing so may sometimes be a
helpful heuristic device. I do not mean to suggest that courts ought
ordinarily attempt to express similar functions algebraically. Nor do I
mean that legal rules ordinarily can be expressed with precision as
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multivariate functions. Indeed, this exercise suggests one of the difficulties, in an "age of balancing,"2 5 of thinking about law as a set of
rules or doctrines: If the most precise expression possible for a rule is
not an expression composed of discrete elements, but instead is a
function of several variables, how much of a rule can we say there
really is in reality?
I -am of course touching on, though I do not mean to delve very
deeply into, the so-called rules-standards debate 26-which strikes me
not so much as a debate as a tension, because I suppose few would say
we should do altogether without bright-line rules or altogether without more flexible standards. I do mean to suggest a certain entropy in
rules, or at least in many rules, that tends to break down their sharp
edges. So long as rules retain their propositional nature, symbolic
logic offers a useful way of thinking about their elements. But as the
rules break down, and as more of one element compensates for less of
another, the importance of logic recedes. In such a case, algebra may
be a useful heuristic device, but it is usually no more than that.
I.

A DYNAMIc Vmw:

BURDENS AND DEFENSES

So far, I have viewed a claim in static terms, divorced from the
procedure by which it is raised and contested. Now I will discuss procedure, in the context of a claim that may be represented propositionally. I will offer here a special logic, what might be called a litigation
logic.
A.

Basic Premises of Litigation Logic

Classical logic is monotonic. The concept of implication is reserved for proof of proposition. Once a proposition is proved, additional premises cannot render the proof invalid. Thus, if X -- Z, then
it must be that [X &Y] --> Z as well. In recent decades, there has been
increasing interest in non-monotonic-or defeasible, default or presumptive--logics. Such logics recognize that often we draw conditions provisionally on one set of premises that we might not accept on a fuller
25 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987).
26 For helpful commentary and explanations, see, for example, Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HAgv. L. REv. 22, 57-69 (1992), and Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review
Essay of Cass R. Sunstein's Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
531, 541-44 (1997) (book review).
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set of premises. 27 Thus, even though X indicates Z, X & Y may not do
so. Non-monotonic reasoning has become a matter of great interest
not only to formal logicians, 28 expecially those engaged in normative,
or deontic, logic,2 9 but also to epistemologists, s0 including those who

27 See, e.g., Drew McDermott, Nonmonotonic Logic II: Nonmonotonic Modal Theories,
29J. Ass'N COMPUTING MACHINERY 33, 33 (1982) (saying that the term nonmonotonic
"refers to first-order theories in which new axioms can wipe out old theorems"); Terry
Winograd, Extended Inference Modes in Reasoning by Computer Systems, 13 ARTIFmIr INTELLIGENCE 5, 5-6 (1980) ("In mathematics, one does not accept a conclusion unless
it can be 'proved' according to the laws of inference and the initially accepted axioms.
In real life, we are faced with limitations of our knowledge and demands for action.... [Non-monotonic reasoning] must draw a conclusion which, on the basis of
further information, it would later reject. Ordinary notions of deduction do not allow
non-monotonicity. If A is provable from a set of initial axioms, then no additional
axioms can ever cause i-A] to be provable, unless the theory is inconsistent.").
28 See, e.g., NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLAUSIBLE REASONING (1976) (developing a formal
system for dealing with cognitive dissonance created by inconsistent information);
Judea Pearl, Probalistic Semantics for Nonmonotonic Reasoning, in PHILOSOPHY AND Al:
ESSAYS AT THE INTERFACE 157 (Robert L. Cummins & John L. Pollock eds., 1991).
Some of the formal explorations of non-monotonic logic have been presented as part
of a logic of theory change. See, e.g., David Makinson, How to Give It Up: A Survey of
FormalAspects of the Logic of Theory Change, 62 SYNTHESE 347 (1985); Carlos E. Alchourr6n et al., On the Logic of Theory Change: PartialMeet Contraction and Revision Functions,
50 J. SYMBOLIC LoGic 510 (1985); see also Peter Gardenfors, The Dynamics of Belief.
Contractionsand Revisions of ProbabilityFunctions, 5 ToPoi 29 (1986) (generalizing upon
prior work with Alchourron and Makinson, modeling states of belief by probability
functions). I am inclined to agree with those who argue that intuitions about how
defaults work are at least often captured better by speaking of flexible inference rules
within a theory rather than of theory change. See McDermott, supra note 27, at 55.
29 See, e.g., DEFEASIBLE DEONTIC LOGIC (Donald Nute ed., 1997); Marvin Belzer,
Reasoning With Defeasible Principles, 66 SYNTHESE 135 (1986). Deontic logic is often
referred to as logic of obligation or logic of norms, involving normative expressions
such as obligation, duty, permission, and right. See Dagfinn Follesdal & Risto
Hilpinen, Deontic Logic: An Introduction,in DEONTIC LOGIC: INTRODUCTORY AND SYsTEMATIC READINGS 1, 1 (Risto Hilpinen ed., 1971). The logic I am presenting here is not
limited to deontic purposes; it is meant to express the interrelation of propositions
material to legal conclusions, and can be used for both descriptive and prescriptive
purposes.
30 See, e.g., John L. Pollock, Defeasible Reasoning, 11 COGNrrrVE SCIENCE 481 (1987);
John L. Pollock, OSCAR- A General Theory of Rationality, in PHILOSOPHY AND Al, supra
note 28, at 189; see also Introducion to id. at 5 (["Olne of the most significant advances
in epistemology in the second half of the twentieth century has been the recognition
that most reasoning is defeasible .... Researchers in artificial intelligence made the
same discovery independently.... .").
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study pragmatic or everyday argument,3 ' cognitive psychologists, 32
33
and scholars of artificial intelligence.
See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. WALTON, PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT IN EVERYDAY CONVERSA(1992). Walton, a participant in this symposium, notes that "a new awakening of
interest in evaluating arguments in relation to how they are really used in conversational context" has resulted in "the advent of the informal logic movement," which is
concerned with "the practical study of how arguments are used in everyday reasoning." Id. at 2. Such use bears a close relation to the use of argument in law. As
Walton says, in everyday conversations,
typically, disputes cannot, given practical constraints, be definitively resolved
by clear, obtainable evidence that proves, beyond doubt, that a proposition
is true or false. Instead, such arguments are typically based on presumptions, and the argument is good or bad, successful or unsuccessful, insofar as
a primafacie case can be made for or against it.
Id. Much the same could, of course, be said about legal argument. Walton's "fundamental thesis" is that argument in everyday conversations needs to be evaluated by
standards that are lower than the inductive or deductive standards typically used in
formal logic. Id. at 3. My aim in this part of the article is to make essentially the same
type of assertion with respect to legal argument. Interestingly also, Walton says that
presumptive reasoning of the type he presents is best considered "in a context of a
dialogue." Id. at 4. In this respect, too, it bears some similarity to the type of logic I
am presenting here, which is meant to represent an argument conducted by two litigants. But then our purposes diverge. Walton is concerned with participants engaged in "reasonable argument," meaning that they adhere to standards under which
the conversation might shed light on the matter. Id. at 6. My purpose is to represent
an argument between adversaries. Under the logic presented here, evaluation of the
argument-determination of what action is to be taken-is critical and is performed
by a third entity, the adjudicative system. In Walton's system, by contrast, evaluation
plays a lesser role and has more modest goals. See id. at 288 ("The proper question of
evaluation is ... whether or not the argument contributes to the critical discussion.").
See also Allan Collins & Ryszard Michalski, The Logic of PlausibleReasoning: A Core
Theory, 13 CoGNrIVE SCIENCE 1 (1989). REscHER, supranote 28, may also be classified
as a work of pragmatic reasoning; much of his concern is in application of his theory
to practical issues of inconsistent information.
32 See, e.g., Daniel N. Osherson et al., Default Probability,15 COGNrIVE SCIENCE 251
(1991).
33 See, e.g., McDermott, supra note 27; Winograd, supranote 27; R. Reiter, A Logic
forDefault Reasoning,13 ARTFCIAL INTELLIGENCE 81 (1980). The Winograd and Reiter
articles are part of an important Special Issue on Non-Monotonic Logic, 13 ARTIICIAL
INTELLIGENCE no. 1, 2 (1980). For another significant special issue, see Default Reasoning, 1 MrS-AND-MAcaINF-s no. 4 (1991). See also Donald Nute, Preface to DEFEaSiBLE
DEONTIC LOGIC, supra note 29, at vii (noting that "despite the long-time interest in
defeasible reasoning within the philosophical community, . . . the investigation of
defeasible or 'nonmonotonic' reasoning received a huge impetus when the artificial
intelligence community discovered it"); Timothy R. Colburn, Heuristics,Justification,
and DefeasibleReasoning,5 MINDS & MACHINES 467, 484-86 (1995) (discussing the role
of defeasible rules in justifying "qualitative heuristics" and contending that ["s]ince
the modeling of defeasibility is critical for the creation of intelligent programs, artifi31
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Interestingly, though jurists are prominent among those who
might be expected to be "natural clients" of the deontic logician,3 4 so
far as I am aware no prior efforts have been made to present a relatively simple logic that is closely related to classical propositional logic
and yet captures the defeasibility of legal conclusions.3 5 In making
this preliminary attempt to do so, I believe I am, mercifully, relieved
from having to rely heavily on the rich, complex, and varied literature
on non-monotonic logic. This is in part because "all the work on
nonmonotonic reasoning in the past twenty years or so has not produced a convergence of systems or even of intuition,"3 6 and in part
because my aim is a logic that is both accessible and designed for the
distinctive problems of litigation and legal doctrine. I will use a special symbol, 0, which might be thought of as an arrowhead, a cropped
form of the arrow of implication. This symbol may be read as "presumptively implies." 37 Thus, X 0 Y means, "If we know X, then Y is
presumptively true, so that if at the end of the case the only material
information we have is X, then we will act as ifY is true." 38 Thus, X is
cial intelligence researchers attempting to do knowledge representation must do
some epistemology in order to understand what they are modeling").
34 See Donald Nute & Xiaochang Yu, Introduction to DEFEASIBLE DEONTIc LOGIC,
supranote 29, at 1. It appears that the earliest known use of the term "defeasible" in
the philosophical literature is by H.L.A. Hart. See Nute, supra note 33, at vii.
35 There have been some important prior works in the legal literature that, in
analyzing litigation or doctrinal problems according to logical methods, have incorporated non-monotonic aspects into the analysis. Much of the work of my colleague
Layman Allen fits this description. See also, e.g., Saunders, supra note 6. A particularly
well known work that might be deemed to fit here is JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE
SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937). Several notable recent works have selfconsciously followed in Wigmore's footsteps. See TERENCE ANDERSON & WILAM TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: HOW TO Do THINGS WITH FACTS (1991);JosEPH B. KADANE
& DAVID A. SCHUM, A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE SACCO AND VANZETTI EVIDENCE
(1996); Peter Tillers & David A. Schum, ChartingNew Tenitory in JudicialProof.Beyond
Wigmore, 9 CARDozo L. REv. 907 (1988). But the aim of all these works is much different from that of the discussion here, as described in the text above. Wigmore and
those following him, for example, are primarily interested in organizing proof of a
case according to systematic methods.
36

Nute, supra note 33, at vii.

37 Throughout this Part, I use the language of burdens and presumptions. I do
not mean the use of these terms to be limited here to the narrow sense in which they

are most rigorously used in the law of evidence. See, e.g., 2

McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

§ § 336, 342 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
38 Howard Pospesel has made the reasonable-sounding suggestion that I attempt
to state a nonverbal definition of the t operator. Perhaps a logician could state such a
definition; I have not been able to state one that satisfies me. But below, in notes 46
and 47, infra, I offer what is perhaps the next best thing, a catalogue of various basic
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not airtight proof of Y; it gives a basis to act as ifY is true unless we
learn more. We may take as a rule that
[(x Z) & [(X &Y] *-Z) & X &Y] 0 -Z.
(13)
That is, if one presumptive implication has a set of premises that is a
subset of the set of premises of another presumptive implication, and
the fuller set of premises is demonstrated, then the latter presumptive
implication-the one operating on more information-is the one
that governs. 3 9
Expression 13 is, in substance, a standard aspect of non-monotonic logics. But now I will add a feature that is more distinctively
addressed to litigation. Let L represent the proposition that the defendant is liable. Because the judicial system must act at the end of
the litigation either as if L is true or as if L is false, we can adopt the
rule that
(X L) v (X 0 -L).
(14)
That is, a given set of premises presumptively implies one outcome or
the other, L or -L; at the end of the case, whatever the factual findings may be, the system must decide one way or the other.
The notion of presumptive implication is, I think, useful in two
ways, suggesting on the one hand how the law may operate without
complete articulation and on the other how complete articulation
might be impossible to accomplish. First, presumptive implication expresses the idea that a given set of premises may yield a particular
result without any necessity for a logical proof that those premises imply that this result must prevail whatever else must be learned. Second, presumptive implication is compatible with the idea that, at least
in some areas of the law, full implication of this more stringent type is
an impossibility. This is a concept that is familiar, and troubling, to
many law students: Try to come up with a rule of law that is complete,
subject to no qualifications or exceptions. It is hard to do. There will
40
almost always be a "spitting cobra" type of exception.
propositions involving the operator, and a statement of various basic propositions involving the operator, and a statement for each whether it does or does not hold true.
39 If (X & Y) Z and (X & W) 0 -Z, then W & X & Y could presumptively imply

either Z or -Z; the situation is not determinate on the information given.
40 I am referring to the following argument by my friend and colleague Brian
Simpson:
Suppose we have a rule that the children are always to have a bath before
going to bed, which seems a sensible enough rule. Obviously there need to
be exceptions. For example, it would be silly to insist on a bath if one of the

children was critically ill with pneumonia. We could try to think of all the
exceptions in advance, but the task is hopeless, as becomes clear on the day
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I do not mean to suggest that implication of the classical type is
foreign to the law. For example, if one proposition is equivalent to
another according to principles of classical implication, then either
may be substituted for the other in a presumptive implication. 41 Perhaps more obviously, a crime may be defined by statute so that the
defendant cannot be deemed to have committed the crime unless the
statutory elements are satisfied. Nevertheless, there is a wide range of
areas in which the law does not operate in a crisp, definitional matter.
Indeed, the fact that a given body of law is definitional does not necessarily eliminate a role for presumptive implication, for the elements of
the definition may be quite vague and conclusory, and presumptive
implication may operate at the level of these elements even if it does
not at the higher level of the claim as a whole.
B.

Litigation Logic in Operation

Now, let 0 equal all the information about the world that the jury
is entitled to bring into the courtroom. 42 Then we may say that
0 * -L.
(15)
That is, based on nothing but the information that the jury is entitled
to carry from the outside world, the defendant is not liable. Notice
that this rule-the presumption of innocence, or the initial allocation
of the burden of production on the plaintiff-does not amount to a
rule that the defendant is not liable. It simply says that if no facts are
established in litigation the defendant wins.
Now the plaintiff brings a complaint. I will use an example used
by Rodes and Pospesel, though with somewhat different notation.
The plaintiff alleges
B & F,
(16)
where B = defendant bought a horse from plaintiff, and F = defendant
failed to pay for the horse.
The complaint itself does not have to contain an argument of law.
Implicit in the complaint, however, is the legal contention that
(0 & B & F) t L.
(17)
when, through an accident to a travelling circus, we find a spitting cobra in
the bath. Nobody would have ever thought of that possibility, and provided
for it by the spitting cobra exception.
A.W.B. SIMPSON, INVITATION TO THE LAW 80 (1988).
41 See infra note 47.
42 See generallyJohn H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEo. L.J. 395 (1985); Richard M.
Fraher, AdjudicativeFacts, Non-Evidence Facts, and PermissibleBackground Information, 62
IND. L.J. 333 (1987).
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Now, assuming proper jurisdiction and venue and all that, the
defendant has three basic choices in responding to this complaint.
First, he may move to dismiss it for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. This amounts to a denial of Proposition 17,
and so according to the rule of Proposition 14, an assertion that
(0 & B & F) -L.
(18)
Second, the defendant may deny an essential factual allegation of
the complaint. That is, he may deny the truth of Proposition 16,
asserting
-(B & F).
(19)
Such a minimalist denial will in itself probably be considered too uninformative. The defendant must identify which of the assertions
made by the plaintiff he intends to deny. 43 Conventional logic shows
that the defendant will effectively assert Proposition 19 if he asserts
either of the propositions -B or -F; he may also assert both.
Third, he may assert an affirmative defense. This is a new issue
that he raises and that, he contends, defeats liability even if the assertions of the complaint are true. Thus, he may assert M, the proposition that he was a minor when he bought the horse. In doing so, he
will be prepared to make-if challenged-the legal argument that
(0 & B & F & M) t -L.
(20)
Note that these three responses are mutually compatible but not
mutually dependent. That is, the defendant could (as a logical matter
and under modem practice) make any one of the three whether he
makes either or both of the other responses. For example, the defendant could contend, "It is not true that I bought the horse from
you and failed to pay for it. Moreover, even if you were able to prove
those allegations they would not be sufficient for relief." The relation
43 I do not believe the defendant needs to be either more particular or more
general than the plaintiff. Thus, I do not accept Rodes and Pospesel's assertion that if
the plaintiff asserts that defendant shot plaintiff with a .38 caliber revolver, the
"[c] orrect response" is "Defendant denies that he shot plaintiff with a .38 caliber revolver or any other weapon." RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 3, at 216. Even if in a
prior era pleading law generally required such a response, a matter on which I am
unsure, I do not believe that it does so in the modem era. The defendant should not
be forced to do the plaintiff's conceptual thinking and to articulate his case, to say in
effect, "Well, you didn't get it quite right, but I understand what category you were
thinking about, and you may have a case in the general vicinity of what you alleged."
If the plaintiff alleged that defendant shot him "with a .38 or with some other
weapon," then the defendant would be required to answer more comprehensively;
part of such a response might be an assertion that the allegation of "some other
weapon" was too vague.

594
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between the motion to dismiss and the affirmative defense is particularly interesting. The affirmative defense may be raised without making the motion to dismiss. In this case, such a stance would effectively
concede the implicit assertion of Proposition 17. This is close to the
old-fashioned confession and avoidance: "I concede that purchase of
the horse and failure to pay would, without more, be sufficient for
relief. But even so, and even if the plaintiff proves everything he's
alleged, the additional factor that I've raised, minority, is enough to
defeat his claim."
Alternatively, the affirmative defense might be a back-up to the
motion to dismiss. That is, the defendant need not confess to avoid.
He might say, "I contend that purchase of the horse and failure to pay
would not, without more, be sufficient for relief. But even if I'm
wrong about that, and even if the plaintiff proves everything he's alleged, the additional factor that I've raised, minority, is enough to
defeat his claim." In making this argument, the defendant might suggest that at least one reason the complaint is inadequate is that it did
not plead -M, the negation of the very proposition raised by the affirmative defense. 4 4 The argument would then have this nature:
An essential element of plaintiff's claim, on the theory that he has
presented, is that the purchaser has achieved the age of consent. 45
44 Stating the argument like this might make it appear that the defendant is being unreasonable by asking that the plaintiff be required to plead and prove a negative. But as Kevin Saunders has argued in a perceptive essay, it is not proving a
negative that is difficult. See Kevin W. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Provinga Negative, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 276 (1985). Any proposition framed in negative terms
might, with a change of wording, be turned into a positive. Thus, for example, "Defendant was not a minor at that time" might be rephrased as "Defendant had achieved
the age of consent by that time." Similarly, "Plaintiff was contributorily negligent"
may be rendered "Plaintiff failed to exercise due care." Saunders also points to another factor that has much more significance in assigning the burdens of proof: It is
generally easier to prove (and more sensible to require pleading of) an existential
proposition than a universal one. Id. at 281. Thus, it is probably easier to prove
"Plaintiff herself failed to exercise due care in that just before the collision she was
eating a sandwich while driving" than to prove "Plaintiff exercised due care at all
material times and in all material respects." Note that the negation of an existential
proposition is a universal, and vice versa.
45 This sentence may require some explanation. I have spoken about various
premises presumptively implying liability or its negation; I have not spoken of liability
as presumptively implying any proposition or set of propositions. As I have suggested
above in discussing the difficulty of complete articulation, the theory on which the
plaintiff pleads is presumably not the exclusive basis on which liability might be
found; for example, a far different set of propositions might warrantjudgment for the
value of the horse on a tort theory. Given that there may be other theories of liability
possible, the defendant probably cannot argue persuasively that -M is logically essen-
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The plaintiff hasn't pleaded that issue, so the complaint should be
dismissed. But in case I'm wrong about that-so that this issue is an
affirmative defense rather than one on which the plaintiff has the
burden of pleading-I have pleaded minority. Even if the plaintiff
proves everything he's alleged, this factor is enough to defeat his
claim.
In other words, even while asserting Propositions 17 and 19 as
well as M, the defendant might be willing to concede, at least for the
purpose of argument, that
(O&B&F&-M) *L.

(21)

Notice that the motion to dismiss and the denial join issue with
the plaintiff, denying the truth of some proposition that, explicitly or
implicitly, the plaintiff has asserted. The affirmative defense does not.
Thus, the plaintiff may respond to the affirmative defense in the same
ways that the defendant responded to the complaint. He may contest
its legal validity, denying the truth of Proposition 20. He may deny its
factual premise M. And he may affirmatively introduce another factor
that, he contends, presumptively establishes liability even if the facts
underlying the affirmative defense are made out. Thus, the plaintiff
may assert N, that the horse was a "necessary," and contend that,
whether or not Proposition 20 is true,
(O&B&F&M&N)

L.

(22)

And so it might go on. Eventually, the judicial system will adjudicate the truth of factual premises and the legal validity of presumptive
implications. According to the rule of Proposition 13, the valid presumptive implication with the fullest set of premises demonstrated to
the satisfaction of the system would then prevail.
The logic I have set out here does not in itself prescribe which
46
presumptive implications-which potential rules of law-are valid.
In some cases, often in conjunction with principles of classical logic, it
tial to liability. But the defendant can argue that the theory that the plaintiff is trying
to articulate is an insufficient basis for liability, and that -M is the minimal extra
proposition necessary to make it sufficient.
At some point in the litigation, it is presumably fair to ask each party, "Are you
contending anything else besides what has been articulated up to this point?" At that
point, it is presumably proper to say that liability implies that one or more of the
theories that has been articulated is legally valid and factually supported.
46 One of the factors limiting the use of presumptive logic to draw inferences
about the validity of legal arguments, rather than merely to state the arguments
clearly, is that many of the principles governing implication in classical logic do not
hold in presumptive logic, or have weak counterparts.
Consider the principle of modus ponens. In classical logic, this principle
prescribes that from (X -- Y) & X, Y follows inevitably. Clearly, from (X t Y) & X, Y
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can be of assistance in this respect, indicating that if one particular
presumptive implication is valid then another particular one is or is
not.47 But the determination of which presumptive implications are

valid is primarily a matter for the lawmaking aspects of the adjudicative system, and they do not operate predominantly on the basis of
logic. 48 The main value of the logic presented here is not that it leads
does not follow inevitably, but we can make the weaker statement that [ (X Y) & X] b
Y.
Nor does the principle of contraposition hold; from X Y, it does not necessarily
follow that the contrapositive, -Y -X, is true. Thus, if X = the driver was driving
under 40 miles per hour and Y = the driver was driving legally, it may be that X t Y is
true but -Y t -X is not.
Similarly, transitivity does not hold; from X t Y and Y b Z, we cannot infer that X
t Z (though this relation would often be true). For example, suppose that X = T was
alive on January 1, 1980, Y = T was alive on January 1, 1986, and Z = T was alive on
January 1, 1992, and that a governing principle is that it is not generally presumed
that a given person was alive on any given date, but that proof that the person was
alive on a date no more than seven years before the given date does create such a
presumption. Then X Y and Y t Z, but it is not true that X t Z.
47 Here are some principles, which I believe may be taken as premises of the
system of defeasible logic presented here. Some of these show how the implication
operator -- , of classical logic may interact with the t operator used here.
If X -- Y, then it must be that X t Y, because classical implication is a stronger
condition than presumptive implication. By contrast, from X Y, it does not follow
that X -

Y.

IfX YandY-- Z,X* Z. Similarly, if XbYandX- Z, ZtY. ButifX YandZ
-- X, it does not necessarily follow (though it usually would) that Z Y. Thus, ifX = a
prospective witness is under 4 years of age, Y = the prospective witness should not be
allowed to testify, and Z = the prospective withness is a very advanced child 3 1/2 years
old, then even if X t Y, it may well be that Z t -Y.
From (X & Y) Z, I believe it follows necessarily that X t (Y Z). But the converse does not hold: From X (Y t Z), it does not necessarily follow that (X & Y) t Z.
Here is a counterexample showing why not. Suppose there are several large bags, one
of which is marked A. In bag A are a number of urns, ten of which are marked B. In
each urn marked B there are ten balls; in seven of those urns, six of the balls are
marked C and in the remaining three urns none of the balls are marked C. A player
picks a bag, then an urn from the bag, then a ball from the urn. Now let A = bag A is
picked, B = a B urn is picked, and C = a C ball is picked, and for purposes of this
problem assume that a conclusion is deemed to be implied presumptively from a
predicate if it is more likely than not given the predicate. Then A t (B t C) is true-if
bag A is picked, it is probable that if a B urn is picked it will be probable that a C ball
will be picked. But (A & B) t C is not true-if bag A is picked and then a B urn, it is
more likely than not that a C ball will not be picked. The intuitive difference is that,
while the second expression has only one statement of uncertainty, the first statement
has two, making it weaker and therefore more easily satisfied.
48 Often, the problem will have the structure suggested in note 39, supra, in
which one party presents the presumptive implication (X &Y) t Z and the other party
presents the presumptive implication (X & W) t -Z. If both presumptive implications
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to conclusions but that it helps set out clearly the nature of a legal
contention, dispute or doctrine.
C. The Logics Compared
I have now sketched out in some detail, though not with formal
rigor, a form of presumptive logic. For several related reasons, I believe it better represents the logic of litigation than does the classical
logic presented by Rodes and Pospesel.
The nature of legal arguments is usually presumptive. No matter
how stridently a lawgiver may proclaim, "If you are a child and it is
evening, you must take a bath," there is an unspoken qualification,
"So long as you don't have pneumonia, and there isn't a spitting cobra
in the bathtub, and there isn't any other reason that I haven't yet articulated as to why you needn't have a bath. '49 The presumptive assertion of law is all that one making a legal argument needs to claim, and
all that he can claim persuasively. (At least that is presumptively true.)
Because it is based on such presumptive assertions, the presumptive logic presented here captures a critical aspect of the dynamics of
litigation, the shifting of burdens. The plaintiff begins with a presumption against him, expressed by Proposition 15. If he fails to persuade the adjudicator that Proposition 16 is true, or that Proposition
17 is legally correct, this does not mean that he loses the litigation, but
only that he has failed to overcome that presumption. If he does persuade the adjudicator with respect to both Proposition 16 and Proposition 17, then he is presumptively entitled to relief. This does not
amount to a logical proof of L, but it shifts the burden to the defendant to come up with a reason why, even though the plaintiffs legal
and factual assertions are correct, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.
The classical logical approach, by contrast, seeks logical proofs of
a proposition. This approach is overly brittle in the litigation context:
If a proposition is not proven, then a judicial resolution cannot be
reached by virtue of it. Consider first the significance of this difficulty
at the outset of the litigation. Without any premises, neither L nor -L
can be proven. Thus, there is nothing in the classical approach comparable to Proposition 15, which expresses the fundamental allocation
of the initial burden of pleading.
are valid, and if in addition W, X, and Y are all taken to be true-so that the overlapping predicates for both presumptive implications are established-the situation is
not logically determinate on this information; the determiner of law must decide
which presumptive implication, Z or -Z, (W & X & Y) follows from Z or -Z.
49 See SIMPSON, supra note 28, at 80.
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Now suppose that the plaintiff pleads a set of premises that he
contends is sufficient for relief. First consider a denial by the defense.
If the denial is accepted as accurate-so that the factual premises asserted by the plaintiff are not completely true-this does not prove
that relief is unwarranted unless it is assumed that the theory raised by
the plaintiff is the exclusive basis for relief. And so Rodes and Pospesel are, in my view, forced to make overly extensive use of the
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius-the inclusion of one thing is
the exclusion of another. They recognize that this principle is only a
principle of legal interpretation, not a logical principle. But they
make the dubious contention that it expresses the usual tendency of
the law,50 and they rely on it heavily to demonstrate that under given
circumstances the defendant cannot be liable. A more parsimonious
approach avoids the question of whether a given doctrine is the exclusive source of relief-unless the exclusivity argument is raised to show
that another purported source of relief is spurious. Instead, this approach relies on the fact that the plaintiff has not raised any other
theory justifying relief, so that if the theory he has raised is not factually supported he has not overcome the initial presumption of nonliability.
A rather similar point holds with respect to defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It may distort matters to treat
the argument supporting the motion, if accepted, as a demonstration
of non-liability. Consider Rodes and Pospesel's rendition, under classical logic, of a declaration of law in the old case of Asseltyne v. Fay
Hotel:51
(x) [Ix-- (y) (Byx -> -Lxy)],

(23)

where Ix = x is an inn, Byx = y is a boarder in x, and Lxy = x is liable
for the property of y destroyed in a fire at the inn. 52 In English, Prop-

osition 23 reads, "An inn is not liable for the property of its boarders
50

RODES

& POSPESEL, supra note 3, at 239. I think this statement is dubious be-

cause so often the maxim is violated. Cf Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theoy of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How StatutesAre to Be Construed, 3 VAND.
L. REV. 395, 405 (1950) (noting that alongside the exclusio unius maxim is another
pointing in the opposite direction: "The language may fairly comprehend many different cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of example."). For example, Rule 11 provides for sanctions for irresponsible conduct that gratuitously
creates extra litigation. But so does 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994). And if the particular
case does not satisfy the requirements of either of these provisions, the court may still
impose a sanction as a matter of its inherent power. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32 (1991).
51 23 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1946).
52 RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 3, at 200.
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destroyed in a fire at the inn." But plainly this is too absolute a statement. An inn may be liable for the property of its boarder if, for example, the inn commits an intentional tort that results in the
destruction of the boarder's property; if the fire in Asseltyne were committed for the purpose of destroying Miss Asseltyne's property, the
hotel presumably would have been liable for the loss (at least absent
some extenuating circumstance-such as that the destruction was necessary to prevent some grave pestilence). A more accurate statement
would be, "The fact that a person is a boarder of a hotel is not in itself
sufficient to create liability for the hotel." In the terms I have used,
(24)
I & B t -L.
This leaves room for the possibility that other facts will presumptively
establish L.
Finally, consider affirmative defenses. Rodes and Pospesel attempt to represent these by using the classical technique of distinguo,
in which one party to a disputation concedes an assertion made by the
other party under one assumption but denies it under a contrary assumption. Thus, the defendant in the horse-sale case, in response to
the plaintiff s assertion that (0 & B & F) -> L, might concede that
(25)
(O&B&F&-M) ->L,
but deny that
(26)
> L,
(O & B & F & M) -assert affirmatively that
(27)
(O & B & F & M) -4 -L,
53
and also assert that M is in fact true.
This is an interesting approach, but I do not believe it fully captures the nature of an affirmative defense.5 4 First, to make the affirm53

Proposition 27 does not follow logically from the denial of Proposition 26, but

Rodes and Pospesel present both (in different notation) as part of the defendant's
argument. See RODES &POSPESEL, supranote 3, at 230-31 (lines 4 and 7B). Similarly,
they include as part of the plaintiff's argument both (a) a negation of the proposition
that the defendant is not liable if the defendant bought the horse while a minor and
the horse is a "necessary" and (b) an affirmative assertion that under these circumstances the defendant is liable. Id. at 231 (lines 8 & 11B).
54 Rodes and Pospesel contend that a statement should be distinguished rather
than denied if any of three circumstances holds. At least two of them are significant
[the statement] will be misleading unless
for affirmative defenses: "Although true ....
additional circumstances are brought forward," and ["The statement] is subject to an

exception which law or common sense requires to be specifically brought forward
.... " Id. at 232. I do not find this articulation helpful. Much more straightforward, it
seems to me, is to say that a defendant should assert a given proposition as an affirmaat least arguably, the plaintiff would be presumptively entitled tojudgtive defense if,
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ative defense, the defendant need not concede the point reflected by
Proposition 25. The defendant might, as I have contended above,
suggest that if the plaintiff were able to prove -M, along with B and F,
he would (presumptively) prevail, but there is no need that he do so.
The defendant might contend that even the premise of Proposition
25 is an insufficient basis for liability; or he might contend that liability cannot be proven because another affirmative defense might defeat
it.

Second, to assert the affirmative defense, the defendant need not
make so strong an assertion as Proposition 27. The defendant need
only make a presumptive assertion. This acknowledges that, even if
(0 & B & F & M) is true, liability may still be made out; the plaintiff
may raise an issue to defeat the effect of M, or he may be able to make
out a different theory of liability altogether.
Finally, although together Propositions 25 and 27 indicate that,
assuming the truth of B and F, the issue of M is critical to the action,
these propositions give no sense of the burden of pleading. In other
words, these propositions act as a sort of melange of a motion to dismiss and an affirmative action. They say in effect, "If B, F, and -M are
true, then he wins, but if M is true I win even if B and F are true."
That is fair enough-but then is the argument that the complaint is
insufficient because it fails to plead -M, or that, although the complaint is sufficient, if the defendant pleads and proves M then liability
is defeated? I have shown in Section B how the presumptive approach
quite neatly separates these arguments.
Perhaps able users of classical logic, like Rodes and Pospesel,
could address these problems-in part, perhaps, by including carefully crafted limitations in the universe to which the application applies. I suspect such attempts would significantly complicate the
application of the logic. The problem, I believe, is that classical logic,
with very broad applicability, is aimed at proofs of propositions. Thus,
it is not well designed for litigation, at least litigation in the common
law style, in which the question is not, "Is the defendant's liability logically proven?" but "Given what we know and what has happened,
should we impose liability on the defendant?" The presumptive logic
I have presented here, a much more specialized tool than classical
logic, is designed expressly to reflect the dynamics of our litigation
system.
ment under a given set of premises that the plaintiff has pleaded, but would not be
presumptively entitled to judgment if that set of premises is supplemented by the
proposition in question.
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CONCLUSION

I do not believe that logic often prescribes results in legal cases.
By the time we are able to make a statement of the form, "If a set of
premises A is true, then a set of consequences B must follow," the
hard work of making law has already been done. But logic can set
constraints on legal doctrine or discourse; a doctrine or argument
that can be shown to be internally inconsistent as a logical matter will
lack persuasive power. Because we often divide a claim into separate
elements, symbolic logic can be a useful heuristic in analyzing the
structure of the claim; in other cases, in which the claim more resembles a function of multiple variables, this usefulness is lessened. In
some settings, the heuristic benefit of logical analysis can be enhanced
by using a logic of the sort presented here, reflecting the defeasibility
of much legal doctrine.
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